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Abstract. Generative adversarial networks (GANs) are powerful tools
for learning generative models. In practice, the training may suffer from
lack of convergence. GANs are commonly viewed as a two-player zero-
sum game between two neural networks. Here, we leverage this game
theoretic view to study the convergence behavior of the training process.
Inspired by the fictitious play learning process, a novel training method,
referred to as Fictitious GAN, is introduced. Fictitious GAN trains the
deep neural networks using a mixture of historical models. Specifically,
the discriminator (resp. generator) is updated according to the best-
response to the mixture outputs from a sequence of previously trained
generators (resp. discriminators). It is shown that Fictitious GAN can
effectively resolve some convergence issues that cannot be resolved by the
standard training approach. It is proved that asymptotically the average
of the generator outputs has the same distribution as the data samples.
1 Introduction
1.1 Generative Adversarial Networks
Generative adversarial networks (GANs) are a powerful framework for learning
generative models. They have witnessed successful applications in a wide range of
fields, including image synthesis [1,2], image super-resolution [3,4], and anomaly
detection [5]. A GAN maintains two deep neural networks: the discriminator and
the generator. The generator aims to produce samples that resemble the data
distribution, while the discriminator aims to distinguish the generated samples
and the data samples.
Mathematically, the standard GAN training aims to solve the following op-
timization problem:
min
G
max
D
V (G,D) = E
x∼pd(x){logD(x)}+ Ez∼pz(z){log(1 −D(G(z)))}. (1)
The global optimum point is reached when the generated distribution pg, which
is the distribution of G(z) given z ∼ pz(z), is equal to the data distribution.
The optimal point is reached based on the assumption that the discriminator and
⋆ First three authors have equal contributions.
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generator are jointly optimized. Practical training of GANs, however, may not
satisfy this assumption. In some training process, instead of ideal joint optimiza-
tion, the discriminator and generator seek for best response by turns, namely the
discriminator (resp. generator) is alternately updated with the generator (resp.
discriminator) fixed.
Another conventional training methods are based on a gradient descent form
of GAN optimization. In particular, they simultaneously take small gradient
steps in both generator and discriminator parameters in each training itera-
tion [6]. There have been some studies on the convergence behaviors of gradient-
based training. The local convergence behavior has been studied in [7, 8]. The
gradient-based optimization is proved to converge assuming that the discrimi-
nator and the generator is convex over the network parameters [9]. The inherent
connection between gradient-based training and primal-dual subgradient meth-
ods for solving convex optimizations is built in [10].
Despite the promising practical applications, a lot of works still witness the
lack of convergence behaviors in training GANs. Two common failure modes
are oscillation and mode collapse, where the generator only produces a small
family of samples [6, 11, 12]. One important observation in [13] is that such non
convergence behaviors stem from the fact that each generator update step is
a partial collapse towards a delta function, which is the best response to the
objective function. This motivates the study of this paper on the dynamics of
best-response training and the proposal of a novel training method to address
these convergence issues.
1.2 Contributions
In this paper, we view GANs as a two-player zero-sum game and the training
process as a repeated game. For the optimal solution to Eq. (1), the correspond-
ing generated distribution and discriminator (p∗g, D
∗) is shown to be the unique
Nash equilibrium in the game. Inspired by the well-established fictitious play
mechanism in game theory, we propose a novel training algorithm to resolve the
convergence issue and find this Nash equilibrium.
The proposed training algorithm is referred to as Fictitious GAN, where the
discriminator (resp. generator) is updated based on the the mixed outputs from
the sequence of historical trained generators (resp. discriminators). The previ-
ously trained models actually carry important information and can be utilized
for the updates of the new model. We prove that Fictitious GAN achieves the
optimal solution to Eq. (1). In particular, the discriminator outputs converge to
the optimum discriminator function and the mixed output from the sequence of
trained generators converges to the data distribution.
Moreover, Fictitious GAN can be regarded as a meta-algorithm that can be
applied on top of existing GAN variants. Both synthetic data and real-world
image datasets are used to demonstrate the improved performance due to the
fictitious training mechanism.
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2 Related Works
The idea of training using multiple GAN models have been considered in other
works. In [14, 15], the mixed outputs of multiple generators is used to approxi-
mate the data distribution. The multiple generators with a modified loss function
have been used to alleviate the mode collapse problem [16]. In [13], the gener-
ator is updated based on a sequence of unrolled discriminators. In [17], dual
discriminators are used to combine the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence and
reverse KL divergences into a unified objective function. Using an ensemble of
discriminators or GAN models has shown promising performance [18, 19]. One
distinguishing difference between the above-mentioned methods and our pro-
posed method is that in our method only a single deep neural network is trained
at each training iteration, while multiple generators (resp. discriminators) only
provide inputs to a single discriminator (resp. generators) at each training stage.
Moreover, the outputs from multiple networks is simply uniformly averaged and
serves as input to the target training network, while other works need to train
the optimal weights to average the network models. The proposed method thus
has a much lower computational complexity.
The use of historical models have been proposed as a heuristic method to
increase the diversity of generated samples [20], while the theoretical convergence
guarantee is lacking. Game theoretic approaches have been utilized to achieve a
resource-bounded Nash equilibrium in GANs [21]. Another closely related work
to this paper is the recent work [22] that applies the Follow-the-Regularized-
Leader (FTRL) algorithm to train GANs. In their work, the historical models
are also utilized for online learning. There are at least two distinct features in
our work. First, we borrow the idea of fictitious play from game theory to prove
convergence to the Nash equilibrium for any GAN architectures assuming that
networks have enough capacity, while [22] only proves convergence for semi-
shallow architectures. Secondly, we prove that a single discriminator, instead of
a mixture of multiple discriminators, asymptotically converges to the optimal
discriminator. This provides important design guidelines for the training, where
asymptotically a single discriminator needs to be maintained. 1
3 Toy Examples
In this section, we use two toy examples to show that both the best-response
approach and the gradient-based training approach may oscillate for simple min-
imax optimization problems.
Take the GAN framework for instance, for the best-response training ap-
proach, the discriminator and the generator are updated to the optimum point
at each iteration. Mathematically, the discriminator and the generator is alter-
1 Due to space constraints, all the proofs in the paper are omitted and can be found
in the Supplementary materials.
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nately updated according to the following rules:
max
D
E
x∼pd(x){logD(x)}+ Ez∼pz(z){log(1−D(G(z))} (2)
min
G
E
z∼pz(z){log(1−D(G(z)))} (3)
Example 1. Let the data follow the Bernoulli distribution pd ∼ Bernoulli (a),
where 0 < a < 1. Suppose the initial generated distribution pg ∼ Bernoulli (b),
where b 6= a. We show that in the best-response training process, the generated
distribution oscillates between pg ∼ Bernoulli (1) and pg ∼ Bernoulli (0).
We show the oscillation phenomenon in training using best-response training
approach. To minimize (3), it is equivalent to find pg such that Ex∼pg(x){log(1−
D(x))} is minimized. At each iteration, the output distribution of the updated
generator would concentrate all the probability mass at x = 0 if D(0) > D(1), or
at x = 1 if D(0) < D(1). Suppose pg(x) = 1{x = 0}, where 1{·} is the indicator
function, then by solving (2), the discriminator at the next iteration is updated
as
D(x) =
pd(x)
pd(x) + pg(x)
, (4)
which yields D(1) = 1 and D(0) < D(1). Therefore, the generated distribu-
tion at the next iteration becomes pg(x) = 1{x = 1}. The oscillation between
pg ∼ Bernoulli (1) and pg ∼ Bernoulli (0) continues by induction. A similar
phenomenon can be observed for Wasserstein GAN.
The first toy example implies that the oscillation behavior is a fundamental
problem to the iterative best-response training. In practical training of GANs,
instead of finding the best response, the discriminator and generator are updated
based on gradient descent towards the best-response of the objective function.
However, the next example adapted from [23] demonstrates the failure of con-
vergence in a simple minimax problem using a gradient-based method.
Example 2. Consider the following minimax problem:
min
−10≤y≤10
max
−10≤x≤10
xy. (5)
Consider the gradient based training approach with step size △. The update
rule of x and y is: [
xn+1
yn+1
]
=
[
1 △
−△ 1
] [
xn
yn
]
. (6)
By using the knowledge of eigenvalues and eigenvectors, we can obtain
[
xn
yn
]
=
[
−cn1 c2 sin(nθ + β)
cn1 c2 cos(nθ + β)
]
, (7)
where c1 =
√
1 +△2 > 1 and c2, θ, β are constants depending on the initial
(x0, y0). As n→∞, since c1 > 1, the process will not converge.
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Fig. 1: Performance of gradient method with fixed step size for Example 2. (a)
illustrates the choices of x and y as iteration processes, the red point (0.1, 0.1) is
the initial value. (b) illustrates the value of xy as a function of iteration numbers.
Figure 1 shows the performance of gradient based approach, the initial value
(x0, y0) = (0.1, 0.1) and step size is 0.01. It can be seen that both players’ actions
do not converge. This toy example shows that even the gradient based approach
with arbitrarily small step size may not converge.
We will revisit the convergence behavior in the context of game theory. A
well-established learning mechanism in game theory naturally leads to a training
algorithm that resolves the non-convergence issues of these two toy examples.
4 Nash Equilibrium in Zero-Sum Games
In this section, we introduce the two-player zero-sum game and describe the
learning mechanism of fictitious play, which provably achieves a Nash equilib-
rium of the game. We will show that the minimax optimization of GAN can be
formulated as a two-player zero-sum game, where the optimal solution corre-
sponds to the unique Nash equilibrium in the game. In the next section we will
propose a training algorithm which simulates the fictitious play mechanism and
provably achieves the optimal solution.
4.1 Zero-Sum Games
We start with some definitions in game theory. A game consists of a set of n play-
ers, who are rational and take actions to maximize their own utilities. Each player
i chooses a pure strategy si from the strategy space Si = {si,0, · · · , si,m−1}. Here
player i has m strategies in her strategy space. A utility function ui(si, s−i),
which is defined over all players’ strategies, indicates the outcome for player i,
where the subscript −i stands for all players excluding player i. There are two
kinds of strategies, pure and mixed strategy. A pure strategy provides a specific
action that a player will follow for any possible situation in a game, while a mixed
strategy µi = (pi(si,0), · · · , pi(si,m−1)) for player i is a probability distribution
over the m pure strategies in her strategy space with
∑
j pi(si,j) = 1. The set of
possible mixed strategies available to player i is denoted by ∆Si. The expected
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utility of mixed strategy (µi, µ−i) for player i is
E {ui(µi, µ−i)} =
∑
si∈Si
∑
s−i∈S−i
ui(si, s−i)pi(si)p−i(s−i). (8)
For ease of notation, we write ui(µi, µ−i) as E {ui(µi, µ−i)} in the following.
Note that a pure strategy can be expressed as a mixed strategy that places
probability 1 on a single pure strategy and probability 0 on the others. A game
is referred to as a finite game or a continuous game, if the strategy space is
finite or nonempty and compact, respectively. In a continuous game, the mixed
strategy indicates a probability density function (pdf) over the strategy space.
Definition 1. For player i, a strategy µ∗i is called a best response to others’
strategy µ−i if ui(µ
∗
i , µ−i) ≥ ui(µi, µ−i) for any µi ∈ ∆Si.
Definition 2. A set of mixed strategies µ∗ = (µ∗1, µ
∗
2, · · · , µ
∗
n) is a Nash equilib-
rium if, for every player i, µ∗i is a best response to the strategies µ
∗
−i played by
the other players in this game.
Definition 3. A zero-sum game is one in which each player’s gain or loss is
exactly balanced by the others’ loss or gain and the sum of the players’ payoff is
always zero.
Now we focus on a continuous two-player zero-sum game. In such a game, given
the strategy pair (µ1, µ2), player 1 has a utility of u(µ1, µ2), while player 2 has a
utility of −u(µ1, µ2). In the framework of GAN, the training objective (1) can be
regarded as a two-player zero-sum game, where the generator and discriminator
are two players with utility functions −V (G,D) and V (G,D), respectively. Both
of them aim to maximize their utility and the sum of their utilities is zero.
Knowing the opponent is always seeking to maximize its utility, Player 1 and
2 choose strategies according to
µ∗1 = argmax
µ1∈∆S1
min
µ2∈∆S2
u(µ1, µ2) (9)
µ∗2 = argmin
µ2∈∆S2
max
µ1∈∆S1
u(µ1, µ2). (10)
Define v = max
µ1∈∆S1
min
µ2∈∆S2
u(µ1, µ2) and v¯ = min
µ2∈∆S2
max
µ1∈∆S1
u(µ1, µ2) as the
lower value and upper value of the game, respectively. Generally, v ≤ v¯. Sion [24]
showed that these two values coincide under some regularity conditions:
Theorem 1 (Sion’s Minimax Theorem [24]). Let X and Y be convex, com-
pact spaces, and f : X×Y → R. If for any x ∈ X, f(x, ·) is upper semi-continuous
and quasi-concave on Y and for any y ∈ Y , f(·, y) is lower semi-continuous and
quasi-convex on X, then infx∈X supy∈Y f(x, y) = supy∈Y infx∈X f(x, y).
Hence, in a zero-sum game, if the utility function u(µ1, µ2) satisfies the con-
ditions in Theorem 1, then v = v¯. We refer to v = v = v¯ as the value of the
game. We further show that a Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game achieves
the value of the game.
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Corollary 1. In a two-player zero-sum game with the utility function satisfying
the conditions in Theorem 1, if a strategy (µ∗1, µ
∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium, then
u(µ∗1, µ
∗
2) = v.
Corollary 1 implies that if we have an algorithm that achieves a Nash equi-
librium of a zero-sum game, we may utilize this algorithm to optimally train a
GAN. We next describe a learning mechanism to achieve a Nash equilibrium.
4.2 Fictitious Play
Suppose the zero-sum game is played repeatedly between two rational players,
then each player may try to infer her opponent’s strategy. Let sni ∈ Si denote
the action taken by player i at time n. At time n, given the previous actions
{s02, s
1
2, · · · , s
n−1
2 } chosen by player 2, one good hypothesis is that player 2 is
using stationary mixed strategies and chooses strategy st2, 0 ≤ t ≤ n − 1, with
probability 1
n
. Here we use the empirical frequency to approximate the proba-
bility in mixed strategies. Under this hypothesis, the best response for player 1
at time n is to choose the strategy µ∗1 satisfying:
µ∗1 = argmax
µ1∈∆S1
u(µ1, µ
n
2 ), (11)
where µn2 is the empirical distribution of player 2’s historical actions. Similarly,
player 2 can choose the best response assuming player 1 is choosing its strategy
according to the empirical distribution of the historical actions.
Notice that the expected utility is a linear combination of utilities under
different pure strategies, hence for any hypothesis µn−i, player i can find a pure
strategy sni as a best response. Therefore, we further assume each player plays
the best pure response at each round. In game theory this learning rule is called
fictitious play, proposed by Brown [25].
Danskin [26] showed that for any continuous zero-sum games with any initial
strategy profile, fictitious play will converge. This important result is summarized
in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let u(s1, s2) be a continuous function defined on the direct product
of two compact sets S1 and S2. The pure strategy sequences {s
n
1} and {s
n
2} are
defined as follows: s01 and s
0
2 are arbitrary, and
sn1 ∈ argmax
s1∈S1
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
u(s1, s
k
2), s
n
2 ∈ argmin
s2∈S2
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
u(sk1 , s2), (12)
then
lim
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
u(sn1 , s
k
2) = lim
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
u(sk1 , s
n
2 ) = v, (13)
where v is the value of the game.
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Fig. 2: Performance of best-response training for Example 1. (a) is Bernoulli
distribution of pg assuming best-response updates. (b) illustrates D(x) in Fic-
titious GAN assuming best response at each training iteration. (c) illustrates
the average of pg(x) in Fictitious GAN assuming best response at each training
iteration.
4.3 Effectiveness of Fictitious Play
In this section, we show that fictitious play enables the convergence of learning
to the optimal solution for the two counter-examples in Section 3.
Example 1: Fig. 2 shows the performance of the best-response approach,
where the data follows a Bernoulli distribution pd ∼ Bernoulli (0.25), the ini-
tialization is D(x) = x for x ∈ [0, 1] and the initial generated distribution pg ∼
Bernoulli (0.1). It can be seen that the generated distribution based on best
responses oscillates between pg(x = 0) = 1 and pg(x = 1) = 1.
Assuming best response at each iteration n, under fictitious play, the discrim-
inator is updated according to Dn = argmaxD
1
n
∑n−1
w=0 V (pg,w, D) and the gen-
erated distribution is updated according to pg,n = argmaxpg
1
n
∑n−1
w=0 V (pg, Dw).
Fig 2 shows the change of Dn and the empirical mean of the generated distri-
butions p¯g,n =
1
n
∑n−1
w=0 pg,w as training proceeds. Although the best-response
generated distribution at each iteration oscillates as in Fig. 2a, the learning
mechanism of fictitious play makes the empirical mean p¯g,n converge to the data
distribution.
Example 2: At each iteration n, player 1 chooses x = argmaxx
1
n
∑n−1
i=0 xyi,
which is equal to 10 ∗ sign(
∑n−1
i=0 yi). Similarly, player 2 chooses y according to
y = −10 ∗ sign(
∑n−1
i=0 xi). Hence regardless of what the initial condition is, both
players will only choose 10 or -10 at each iteration. Consequently, as iteration
goes to infinity, the empirical mixed strategy only proposes density on 10 and
-10. It is proved in the Supplementary material that the mixed strategy (σ∗1 , σ
∗
2)
that both players choose 10 and -10 with probability 12 is a Nash equilibrium for
this game. Fig 3 shows that under fictitious play, both players’ empirical mixed
strategy converges to the Nash equilibrium and the expected utility for each
player converges to 0.
One important observation is fictitious play can provide the Nash equilibrium
if the equilibrium is unique in the game. However, if there exist multiple Nash
equilibriums, different initialization may yield different solutions. In the above
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Fig. 3: (a) and (b) illustrate the empirical distribution of x and y at 10 and -10,
respectively. (c) illustrates the expected utility for player 1 under fictitious play.
example, it is easy to check (0, 0) is also a Nash equilibrium, which means both
players always choose 0, but fictitious play can lead to this solution only when
the initialization is (0, 0). The good thing we show in the next section is, due
to the special structure of GAN (the utility function is linear over generated
distribution), fictitious play can help us find the desired Nash equilibrium.
5 Fictitious GAN
5.1 Algorithm Description
As discussed in the last section, the competition between the generator and dis-
criminator in GAN can be modeled as a two-player zero-sum game. The following
theorem proved in the supplementary material shows that the optimal solution
of (1) is actually a unique Nash equilibrium in the game.
Theorem 3. Consider (1) as a two-player zero-sum game. The optimal solution
of (1) with p∗g = pd and D
∗(x) = 1/2 is a unique Nash equilibrium in this game.
The value of the game is − log 4.
By relating GAN with the two-player zero-sum game, we can design a training
algorithm to simulate the fictitious play such that the training outcome converges
to the Nash equilibrium
Fictitious GAN, as described in Algorithm 1, adapts the fictitious play learn-
ing mechanism to train GANs. We use two queues D and G to store the histori-
cally trained models of the discriminator and the generator, respectively. At each
iteration, the discriminator (resp. generator) is updated according to the best
response to V (G,D) assuming that the generator (resp. discriminator) chooses
a historical strategy uniformly at random. Mathematically, the discriminator
and generator are updated according to (14) and (15), where the outputs due
to the generator and the discriminator is mixed uniformly at random from the
previously trained models. Note the the back-propagation is still performed on
a single neural network at each training step. Different from standard training
approaches, we perform k0 gradient descent updates when training the discrim-
inator and the generator in order to achieve the best response. In practical
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learning, queues D and G are maintained with a fixed size. The oldest model is
discarded if the queue is full when we update the discriminator or the generator.
Algorithm 1 Fictitious GAN training algorithm.
Initialization: Set D and G as the queues to store the historical models of the
discriminators and the generators, respectively.
while the stopping criterion is not met do
for k = 1, · · · , k0 do
Sample data via minibatch x1, · · · ,xm.
Sample noise via minibatch z1, · · · ,zm.
Update the discriminator via gradient ascent:
∇θd
1
m
m∑
i=1
[
log(D(xi)) +
1
|G|
∑
Gw∈G
log(1−D(Gw(zi)))
]
. (14)
end for
for k = 1, · · · , k0 do
Sample noise via minibatch z1, · · · ,zm.
Update the generator via gradient descent:
∇θg
[
1
m|G|
m∑
i=1
∑
Dw∈D
log(1−Dw(G(zi)))
]
. (15)
end for
Insert the updated discriminator and the updated generator into D and G, respec-
tively.
end while
The following theorem provides the theoretical convergence guarantee for
Fictitious GAN. It shows that assuming best response at each update in Ficti-
tious GAN, the distribution of the mixture outputs from the generators converge
to the data distribution. The intuition of the proof is that fictitious play achieves
a Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games. Since the optimal solution of
GAN is a unique equilibrium in the game, fictitious GAN achieves the optimal
solution.
Theorem 4. Suppose the discriminator and the generator are updated according
to the best-response strategy at each iteration in Fictitious GAN, then
lim
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
w=0
pg,w(x) = pd(x), (16)
lim
n→∞
Dn(x) =
1
2
, (17)
where Dw(x) is the output from the w-th trained discriminator model and pg,w
is the generated distribution due to the w-th trained generator.
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5.2 Fictitious GAN as a Meta-Algorithm
One advantage of Fictitious GAN is that it can be applied on top of existing
GANs. Consider the following minimax problem:
min
G
max
D
V (G,D) = E
x∼pd(x){f0(D(x))}+ Ez∼pz(z){f1(D(G(z)))}, (18)
where f0(·) and f1(·) are some quasi-concave functions depending on the GAN
variants. Table 1 shows the family of f -GAN [9,10] and Wasserstein GAN.
We can model these GAN variants as two-player zero-sum games and the
training algorithms for these variants of GAN follow by simply changing f0(·)
and f1(·) in the updating rule accordingly in Algorithm 1. Following the proof
in Theorem 4, we can show that the time average of generated distributions will
converge to the data distribution and the discriminator will converge to D∗ as
shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Variants of GANs under the zero-sum game framework.
Divergence metric f0(D) f1(D) D
∗ value of the game
Kullback-Leibler log(D) 1−D 1 0
Reverse KL −D logD 1 -1
Pearson χ2 D − 1
4
D2 −D 0 0
Squared Hellinger χ2 1−D 1− 1/D 1 0
Jensen-Shannon log(D) log(1−D) 1
2
-log 4
WGAN D −D 0 0
6 Experiments
Our Fictitious GAN is a meta-algorithm that can be applied on top of existing
GANs. To demonstrate the merit of using Fictitious GAN, we apply our meta-
algorithm on DCGAN [27] and its extension conditional DCGAN. Conditional
DCGAN allows DCGAN to use external label information to generate images
of some particular classes. We evaluate the performance on a synthetic dataset
and three widely adopted real-world image datasets. Our experiment results
show that Fictitious GAN could improve visual quality of both DCGAN and
conditional GAN models.
Image dataset. (1) MNIST: contains 60,000 labeled images of 28 × 28
grayscale digits. (2) CIFAR-10: consists of colored natural scene images sized
at 32 × 32 pixels. There are 50,000 training images and 10,000 test images in
10 classes. (3) CelebA: is a large-scale face attributes dataset with more than
200K celebrity images, each with 40 attribute annotations.
Parameter Settings. We used Tensorflow for our implementation. Due to
GPU memory limitation, we limit number of historical models to 5 in real-world
image dataset experiments. More architecture details are included in supplemen-
tary material.
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6.1 2D Mixture of Gaussian
Fig. 4 shows the performance of Fictitious GAN for a mixture of 8 Gaussain
data on a circle in 2 dimensional space. We use the network structure in [13]
to evaluate the performance of our proposed method. The data is sampled from
a mixture of 8 Gaussians uniformly located on a circle of radius 1.0. Each has
standard deviation of 0.02. The input noise samples are a vector of 256 indepen-
dent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian variables with mean zero and
unit standard deviation.
While the original GANs experience mode collapse [13, 17], Fictitious GAN
is able to generate samples over all 8 modes, even with a single discriminator
asymptotically.
Iteration 0 Iteration 10k Iteration 20k Iteration 30k Iteration 34k
Fig. 4: Performance of Fictitious GAN on 2D mixture of Gaussian data. The data
samples are marked in blue and the generated samples are marked in orange.
6.2 Qualitative Results for Image Generation
We show visual quality of samples generated by DCGAN and conditional DC-
GAN, trained by proposed Fictitious GAN. In Fig. 5 first row corresponds to
generated samples. We apply train DCGAN on CelebA dataset, and train con-
ditional DCGAN on MNIST and CIFAR-10. Each image in the first row cor-
responds to the image in the same grid position in second row of Fig. 5 . The
second row shows the nearest neighbor in training dataset computed by Eu-
clidean distance. The samples are randomly drawn without cherry picking, they
are representative of model output distribution.
In CelebA, we can generate face images with various genders, skin colors and
hairstyles. In MNIST dataset, all generated digits have almost visually identi-
cal samples. Also, digit images have diverse visual shapes and fonts. CIFAR-10
dataset is more challenging, images of each object have large visual appearance
variance. We observe some visual and label consistency in generated images and
the nearest neigbhors, especially in the categories of airplane, horse and ship.
Note that though we theoratical proved that Fictitious GAN could improve ro-
bustness of training in best response strategy, the visual quality still depends on
the baseline GAN architecture and loss design, which in our case is conditional
DCGAN.
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Fig. 5: Generated images in CelebA, MNIST and CIFAR-10. Top row samples are
generated, bottom row images are corresponding nearest neighbors in training
dataset.
6.3 Quantitative Results
In this section, we quantitatively show that DCGAN models trained by our
Fictitious GAN could gain improvement over traditional training methods. Also,
we may have a better performance by applying Fictitious gan on other existing
gan models. The results of comparison methods are directly copied as reported.
Metric. The visual quality of generated images is measured by the widely
used Inception score metric [20]. It measures visual objectiveness of generated
image and correlates well with human scoring of the realism of generated images.
Following evaluation scheme of [20] setup, we generate 50,000 images from our
model to compute the score.
Table 2: Inception Score on CIFAR-10.
Method Score
Fictitious cDCGAN* 7.27 ± 0.10
DCGAN* [28](best variant) 7.16 ± 0.10
MIX+WGAN* [14] 4.04 ± 0.07
Fictitious DCGAN 6.63 ± 0.06
DCGAN [28] 6.16 ± 0.07
GMAN [18] 6.00 ± 0.19
WGAN [14] 3.82 ± 0.06
Real data 11.24 ± 0.12
Note: * denotes models that use labels for training.
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Fig. 6: We show that Fictitious-GAN can improve Inception score as a meta-
algorithm with larger number of historical models , We select 2 divergence met-
rics from Table 1: Jenson-Shanon and KL divergence.
As shown in Table 2, Our method outperforms recent state-of-the-art meth-
ods. Specifically, we improve baseline DCGAN from 6.16 to 6.63; and conditional
DCGAN model from 7.16 to 7.27. It sheds light on the advantage of training with
the proposed learning algorithm. Note that in order to highlight the performance
improvement gained from fictitious GAN, the inception score of reproduced DC-
GAN model is 6.72, obtained without using tricks as [20]. Also, we did not use
any regularization terms such as conditional loss and entropy loss to train DC-
GAN, as in [28]. We expect higher inception score when more training tricks are
used in addition to Fictitious GAN.
6.4 Ablation studies
One hyperparameter that affects the performance of Fictitious GAN is the num-
ber of historical generator (discriminator) models. We evaluate the performance
of Fictitious GAN with different number of historical models, and report the
inception scores on the 150-th epoch in CIFAR-10 dataset in Fig. 6. We keep the
number of historical discriminators the same as the number of historical gener-
ators. We observe a trend of performance boost with an increasing number of
historical models in 2 baseline GAN models. The mean of inception score slightly
drops for Jenson-Shannon divergence metric when the copy number is 4, due to
random initialization and random noise generation in training.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we relate the minimax game of GAN to the two-player zero-sum
game. This relation enables us to leverage the mechanism of fictitious play to
design a novel training algorithm, referred to as fictitious GAN. In the training
algorithm, the discriminator (resp. generator) is alternately updated as best
response to the mixed output of the stale generator models (resp. discriminator).
This novel training algorithm can resolve the oscillation behavior due to the pure
best response strategy and the inconvergence issue of gradient based training in
some cases. Real world image datasets show that applying fictitious GAN on top
of the existing DCGAN models yields a performance gain of up to 8%.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of (7)
The eigenvalues of the transition matrix in (6) are 1 +△i and 1−△i, and the
corresponding eigenvectors are e1 = [i, 1]
′ and e2 = [i,−1]
′, respectively. The
initial condition (x0, y0) can written as:
[
x0
y0
]
=
y0 − x0i
2
[
i
1
]
+
−y0 − x0i
2
[
i
−1
]
=
y0 − x0i
2
e1 +
−y0 − x0i
2
e2. (19)
Combining (6) and (19), we have
[
xn
yn
]
= (1 +△i)n
y0 − x0i
2
e1 + (1−△i)
n−y0 − x0i
2
e2. (20)
Define c1 =
√
(1 +△2), c2 =
1
2
√
x20 + y
2
0 , θ = arctan(△) and β = − arctan
x0
y0
.
Then (xn, yn) can be calculated as:
[
xn
yn
]
=
[
−cn1 c2 sin(nθ + β)
cn1 c2 cos(nθ + β)
]
. (21)
8.2 Proof of Corollary 1
Suppose (µ∗1, µ
∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium, then from the definition, we know
u(µ1, µ
∗
2) ≤ u(µ
∗
1, µ
∗
2) ≤ u(µ
∗
1, µ2) (22)
for any µ1 ∈ ∆S1 and µ2 ∈ ∆S2. Hence we have
v¯ = inf
µ2∈∆S2
sup
µ1∈∆S1
u(µ1, µ2) (23)
≤ sup
µ1∈∆S1
u(µ1, µ
∗
2) (24)
≤ u(µ∗1, µ
∗
2) (25)
= inf
µ2∈∆S2
u(µ∗1, µ2) (26)
≤ sup
µ1∈∆S1
inf
µ2∈∆S2
u(µ1, µ2) (27)
= v. (28)
Since v = v¯ = v, we obtain u(µ∗1, µ
∗
2) = v.
8.3 Proof of Nash Equilibrium for Example 2
Now, we show the mixed strategy (σ∗1 , σ
∗
2) that both players choose 10 and -10
with probability 12 is a Nash equilibrium for the minimax game.
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Take player 1 for instance, given σ∗2 , then for any possible mixed strategy σ1,
where σ1(x) indicates the probability she chooses value x, we know the expected
utility for her is:
1
2
∫ 10
x=−10
10 ∗ xσ1(x)dx +
1
2
∗
∫ 10
x=−10
(−10) ∗ xσ1(x)dx = 0. (29)
Hence no matter what her strategy is, the expected utility is always 0 and
therefore player 1 has no incentive to deviate from strategy σ∗1 given σ
∗
2 . Similarly,
we can show player 2 has no incentive to deviate from σ∗2 given σ
∗
1 . Thus, the
mixed strategy (σ∗1 , σ
∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium.
8.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Let V (pg, D) be as defined in (37). A Nash equilibrium in a zero-sum game is a
mixed strategy (µ∗D, µ
∗
G) with corresponding pdf of (σ
∗
D, σ
∗
g) such that
σ∗D = argmax
σD
∫
D
∫
g
σDσ
∗
gV (pg, D)dgdD (30)
σ∗g = argmin
σg
∫
D
∫
g
σgσ
∗
DV (pg, D)dgdD. (31)
Define p∗g(x) =
∫
g
σ∗gpg(x)dg. Note that p
∗
g(x) is also a valid probability
density over x. We have
∫
g
σ∗gV (pg, D)dg =
∫
g
σ∗gV (pg, D)dg (32)
=
∫
g
σ∗g
[
E
x∼pd(x){logD(x)} + Ex∼pg(x){log(1−D(x))}
]
dg
(33)
= E
x∼pd(x){logD(x)}+ Ex∼p∗g(x){log(1−D(x)) (34)
= V (p∗g, D). (35)
Hence (30) can be rewritten as:
σ∗D = argmax
σD
∫
D
σDV (p
∗
g, D)dD, (36)
and given p∗g, the optimal strategy for the discriminator is to choose D
∗(x) =
pd(x)
pd(x)+p∗g(x)
with probability 1, which means the best response is a pure strategy.
Therefore, at any Nash equilibrium, the generator generates data following
a pure distribution p∗g, while the discriminator chooses a pure response D
∗(x).
Moreover, p∗g = pd is the only solution to (31), i.e., the generator has no incentive
to deviate. Consequently, the only possible Nash equilibrium is p∗g = pd and
D∗(x) = 12 for any x.
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8.5 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. For the minimax game of (1), let pg(x) be the generated distribution.
We rewrite the optimization problem as
min
pg
max
D
V (pg, D) = Ex∼pd(x){logD(x)} + Ex∼pg(x){log(1 −D(x))}. (37)
With pg fixed, V (pg, D) is semi-continuous and quasi-concave in D; and with
D fixed, V (pg, D) is semi-continuous and quasi-convex in pg. Thus, the utility
function V (pg, D) satisfies the conditions in Theorem 1.
Moreover, by Theorem 3, the unique Nash equilibrium of the game is shown
to be p∗g(x) = pd(x) and D
∗(x) = 1/2 for all x. The value of the game is
V (p∗g(x), D
∗(x)) = − log 4.
In Fictitious GAN, the discrimination function of n-th model satisfies Dn =
argmaxD
1
n
∑n−1
w=0 V (pg,w, D). Let p¯g,n =
1
n
∑n−1
w=0 pg,w. It is easy to see that
p¯g,n is also a valid pdf. Then we have
1
n
n−1∑
w=0
V (pg,w, D) = Ex∼pd(x){logD(x)}+
1
n
n−1∑
w=0
E
x∼pg,w(x){log(1 −D(x))}
(38)
= V (p¯g,n, D). (39)
Therefore, the optimal discrimination function of n-th model is calculated as
Dn(x) =
pd(x)
pd(x) + p¯g,n(x)
. (40)
Thus, V (p¯g,n, Dn) = 2JSD(p¯g,n||pd) − log 4, where JSD(pg||pd) is the Jensen-
Shannon divergence between pg and pd as defined in [6]. By Theorem 2, we have
1
n
∑n−1
w=0 V (pg,w, Dn)→ − log 4, which implies that JSD(p¯g,n||pd) tends to zero.
Since JSD(pg||pd) = 0 if and only if pg(·) = pd(·), (16) is established. Combining
(40) and (16) yields (17).
8.6 Network Architectures and Parameters
All architectures are chosen as recommended by a publicly avaiable implemen-
tation2.
Experiment on synthetic data: The generator has two hidden layers of
size 128 with ReLU activation. The last layer is a linear projection to two dimen-
sions. The discriminator has one hidden layer of size 128 with ReLU activation
followed by a fully connected network to a sigmoid activation. All the biases are
initialized to be zeros and the weights are initalilzed via the “Xavier” initial-
ization [29]. The training updates the discriminator and the generator using 3
sub-iterations. The Adam optimizer is used to train the discriminator with 2e-4
2 https://github.com/carpedm20/DCGAN-tensorflow
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learning rate and the generator with 1.2 × 10−4 learning rate. The minibatch
sample number is 64.
Experiment on MNIST, CIFAR-10, Celeb-A: GAN networks were
trained using the Adam optimizer [30] with batches of size 64 and learning
rate 2×10−4, for around 150K generator iterations in the case of CIFAR-10 and
100K for MNIST.
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